Special Operations Executive (SOE) towards foreign nationals in its employ who were suspected of conducting a dual role; specifically, its Nationalist (KMT) Chinese agents, who were thought to be engaged in intelligence gathering in India on behalf of Chiang Kai-Shek while contributing to the covert war against the Japanese. The study also offers something more than an interesting footnote to the history of SOE, and can be placed within the wider context of intelligence and security issues at the twilight of British rule in India. SOE's efforts to address its concerns about Chinese recruits, along with the ultimate form taken by the Chinese Intelligence Section, provide us with an insight into the limitations of the work of the intelligence and security authorities, in both Delhi and London, which focused their attention, unsurprisingly, upon those threats that had clear potential to damage British interests. Through the study of the specific problem faced by SOE in terms of the reliability of its Chinese agents, this article aims to explore how security concerns that failed to fit easily within the parameters of imperial security were dealt with; specifically, how the problem posed by India's Chinese population was addressed.
Increased availability of archival material from the 1990s onwards has resulted in greater academic interest in the role of Britain's intelligence and security apparatus during the twilight years of the British empire. Studies that explore the activities of the various agencies either in specific imperial territories, or in relation to the British empire more generally, have followed. A number of works have explored security and intelligence issues in relation to British India, building upon Richard Popplewell's pioneering Intelligence and Imperial Defence, which chronicled the development of a security-intelligence apparatus in the early years of the twentieth century that, while small scale, was nevertheless global in its reach. 1 Further details about that apparatus have since emerged. Patrick French has illustrated the part played by the security and intelligence authorities in the maintenance of British rule in India beyond the 1920s and until independence, pointing in particular to the 'central role' of the London-based Indian Political Intelligence (IPI), which was 'devoted to the internal and external security of British India', working in conjunction with the Delhi-based Intelligence Bureau (DIB or IB), the Indian equivalent of MI5. 2 Kate O'Malley's research into the links between Indian and Irish independence movements has provided further insight into IPI operations. 3 More recent studies have seen a shift in organisational emphasis away from the Bureau and IPI; both Christopher Andrew and Calder Walton have drawn attention to the role of the Security Service (MI5), emphasising its imperial credentials and exploring its role during, and in the aftermath of, independence, culminating in the agreement of the Indian authorities for an MI5 Security Liaison Officer to be stationed with the Bureau. 4 Andrew and
Walton also emphasise the distinction between the activities of MI5 and police special branches, which have been the subject of some attention in relation to colonial security matters, arguing that 'colonial policing, which involved law and order, was not the same as imperial security intelligence, which involved national security, and operated in a realm outside the confines of law enforcement'. 5 Attention has also been drawn to MI5's continued interest in independent India as a member of the Commonwealth. 6 Through these studies, which provide an insight into the work of the various intelligence and security agencies concerned, we can discern what were considered, from the British perspective, to be the main threats to internal security in India, at the heart of which lay Indian nationalism, and the struggle for independence. During the early years of the twentieth century, security was threatened by the challenge to British rule posed by the Indian revolutionary movement, whose 'revolutionary terrorism' included an assassination attempt on the viceroy, Lord Hardinge, in December 1912. 7 While some continued to advocate the use of force to achieve their goal, the nonviolent path adopted by Congress during the interwar years was complicated by the emergence of Communism, which added a new dimension to the nationalist threat to the security of British India. As Walton notes, while MI5, along with IPI and the Bureau continued 'to keep a close watch on the main anti-colonial political leaders in India', the main focus 'increasingly became communist agents travelling between Britain and India', with files being opened on 'many Congress and Muslim league leaders…not because the intelligence agencies viewed Congress and the Muslim league as "subversive"…but because some of their members were known or suspected to be closely affiliated with communism'. 8 All of this supports Richard Aldrich's observation that 'British colonial governments in India, Malaya and Hong Kong…developed, over decades, effective, if narrowly focused, security intelligence services designed to address internal threats from nationalists, communists or other types of "agitators"'. 9 But what about other concerns and perceived threats to Indian internal security that failed to conform to this prevailing British colonial mindset? As Aldrich continues, the same security apparatus effectively ignored 'the problems of external foreign threats and potential adversaries in Asia', such as Japan and
China. Concerns over covert Chinese activity in India, an issue that blurred the distinction between internal and external threats, do not figure prominently in the existing studies detailed above, which tend -reasonably enough -to follow the grain of the newly available archival material. This article does not seek to claim the discovery of a 'missing dimension' in the existing literature. Rather, the absence can be considered an accurate reflection of the priorities of the intelligence and security agencies themselves. As such, its significance lies in what it suggests about the limitations of the British colonial security mindset.
I
While remaining low throughout the nineteenth century, Chinese settlement in India, focused primarily upon Calcutta, began to grow during the early twentieth century, in part a consequence of the ongoing struggle between the Nationalists and Communists in China during the interwar years. 10 The figure continued to rise following the onset of the Second formalities', while a survey from August noted that 'During the last six months the problem of the Chinese in India has become increasingly troublesome', the situation explained as the result of 'lack of discipline, and open contempt for passport and security regulations'. 25 The report openly acknowledged that 'much of the trouble they have caused has not been of direct interest to the security authorities', but nevertheless maintained that 'a potential threat to security is inseparable from the presence of large Chinese communities in areas of military importance'.
The situation was 'aggravated by the variety of the Chinese organisations, official and quasiofficial, the constant changes in their personnel, the sometimes rather vague definitions of the latter's duties, and the continuous two-way stream of passenger traffic between China and India'. Such confusion provided 'favourable cover' not only to 'those who may be working against the Chungking regime or for the enemy', but also for 'unscrupulous Chinese, whose main preoccupation seems to be to line their own pockets'. 26 It was within this existing atmosphere of growing concern over Chinese activity in India that Force 136, the Far Eastern incarnation of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), came to appreciate its own Chinese security problem.
II
Force 136 was slow to get to grips with security affairs in general, and to appreciate the potential security risk posed by its Nationalist Chinese recruits in particular. Formed in the aftermath of the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk and the fall of France, SOE was designed to both encourage and develop resistance movements in Nazi occupied territory, and to carry out targeted acts of sabotage. 27 SOE's immediate focus was occupied Europe, but it was not long before the organisation turned its attention further afield. Force 136 lacked dedicated Security provision until early 1944, in marked contrast to developments at SOE headquarters in London, where a Security Section was established within three months of the creation of SOE itself. 29 The need for such a section was recognised during the summer of 1943, and resulted in the appointment of Lt Col John RE Guild as Chief Security Officer, who arrived to take up the position in March 1944, followed by further security personnel. 30 Considered a 'shrewd and practical "Business man"' who possessed 'plenty of initiative, drive and cunning', Guild spent his first three months reviewing the security situation in India, visiting all Force 136 establishments. 31 He began his first report to SOE London by noting that 'By and large, the operational and internal security of Force 136 is good', describing the mission staff as 'definitely security minded'. 32 However, Guild felt that there were certain aspects of security that required further attention. These were the product of specific regional circumstances, and he advocated the development of 'entirely new' methods to address them, arguing that 'attempts to adapt European methods to the Asiatic field' would prove ineffective. 33 Alongside problems caused by geography and language, 34 Guild expressed concern over the 'types of agents recruited'; of the 456 recruits currently undergoing training, he observed that just under half were Chinese. 35 In contrast to the attitude that had previously prevailed at the Mission, support from the Nationalist Chinese authorities having initially been much appreciated, Guild felt that the Chinese recruits represented 'by far the most important problem facing the Security Section'. 36 Beyond a general concern about Chinese security, the perceived weakness of which led Guild to observe that 'we can never be sure that we are not infiltrated by Japanese agents', of more pressing concern was the fact that one of the sources of Chinese Section, while the main role of CIW appears to have been censoring mail bound for China, simultaneously gathering intelligence from its contents. 40 As such, Guild proposed the creation of a unit within Force 136 itself, designed to both 'bring to the surface any possible Japanese agents' and uncover 'Chinese intelligence methods'. 41 This marked a significant departure from SOE's established procedure for dealing with security cases. Nevertheless, it was looked upon favourably both within Force 136 and beyond: it received the 'strong support' of the Commander of the Mission, Colin Mackenzie, while at SOE Headquarters in London the plan was approved by the organisation's Director of Intelligence and Security, Archie Boyle. 42 Perhaps most significantly, the plan won the support of Sir Denys. Aware that the cooperation of the Bureau would be 'essential if anything is to be done in this direction', Guild had been careful to discuss the proposal with him 'in detail'. Sir Denys recognised that such an organisation would 'doubtless be able to supply the I.B. with some valuable information if our agents were in any way successful in unearthing Chinese intelligence methods in this country'.
Promising Guild that he would provide 'all possible help', 43 he proceeded to cable Indian Political Intelligence (IPI), the organisation that monitored Indian nationalism across Europe and acted as liaison for the Bureau in London, 'asking that all support may be given to the scheme'. 44 His support was further reflected in his willingness to share the financial burden involved, agreeing to 'bear cost of administration and all other expenses'. 45 Despite receiving such support, the difficulties experienced in finding the 'extremely highly trained' officer that Guild believed was needed to run the Section meant that progress was slow. Guild thought that such an officer could be provided 'from one of M.I.5's affiliated organisations which have conducted counter espionage abroad', but any hopes that MI5 would be able to help proved unfounded. 46 Forwarding a copy of Guild's Security Report to 'Tar'
Robertson, Head of MI5's B1(a) Section, John Senter, Head of SOE Security in London, asked whether a suitable officer could be seconded to SOE 'to deal with the Chinese problem', noting that SOE would be 'most grateful' for such help. 47 Having recently 'sent a great many officers to work in 21 Army Group' MI5 did not relish the prospect of losing any more, a sentiment that was reflected in Robertson's reply. 48 Such a lack of support from MI5 slowed the scheme down considerably, although the organisation appreciated the problem; Robertson acknowledged that Tai Li's intelligence organisation was 'an extremely good one', designed 'to collect the maximum amount of intelligence that it can from China's allies' for transmission to Chungking. As far as Robertson was concerned, this made Tai Li a 'highly undesirable' source of agents 'from a security point of view', concluding that it would be 'better' for SOE 'to have no agents at all'. 49 Undeterred by MI5's concerns, and despite the continued absence of a suitable officer to run the Section, a formal application for funding was prepared for SOE's Director of Finance, John Venner, by the Deputy Director for SOE's Overseas Groups and Missions, Lt Col L.F. Sheridan. The scheme was now presented as a collaborative effort that would see SOE work in tandem with the Intelligence Bureau. Sheridan explained that it was impractical for SOE to proceed alone ('our relations with the Chinese would be fatally damaged if it became known that we ourselves were enquiring into the Chinese agents or contacts that had been provided for us'), but equally unreasonable to expect the Bureau to take on the extra work ('D.I.B's answer would probably be that while they agreed on the necessity for a Chinese Department for general purposes, it is not reasonable to ask them to undertake a great deal of work for S.O.E. without S.O.E. making some contribution'). 50 The continuing need for the Section was reiterated by Mackenzie in December. Writing to Boyle, he expressed his hope 'that the right man may be found for the Counter Espionage scheme, as I consider it to be of very great importance'. This importance had been heightened by the decision to continue training agents in Calcutta. While this had been based on sound practical considerations, Mackenzie pointed out that Sir Denys had admitted that 'security in the Calcutta area is practically out of the question...it is therefore essential that we should do everything humanly possible to prevent leakages or interference in connection with our agents.
GUILD's scheme is the only way I can see for effectively dealing with this problem'. 54 That the scheme would benefit the Government of India also continued to stand in its favour.
Mackenzie suggested that its takeover by the Bureau at the end of the war ('providing it was working properly') was a fait accompli, and felt that this constituted 'a strong recommendation in its favour':
I am sure that the India Office will strongly support the view that there is going to be a major Chinese problem in India after the war and an agency of this kind would be of great assistance to the Home Department, Government of India. 55 Progress was finally made on finding a suitable candidate to run the Section later in the month.
Sir George Moss, who advised SOE about its work in the region, suggested Lt Col Kenneth
Morrison Bourne, and enquiries were made about his availability. 56 Born in November 1893,
Bourne had been a member of the Shanghai Municipal Police from 1919, becoming
Commissioner in 1938. 57 In Canada on leave when war broke out, and 'having his leave pay only', he subsequently found employment with British Security Co-ordination (BSC) in New York, the wartime body responsible for liaison between the British and American intelligence communities. 58 Bourne was described as a 'first-class executive' by an unnamed SIS officer, and 'a man of experience and ability'. 59 When approached, he proved 'keen' to take the job, and BSC had 'no objection' to his release. 60 Bourne arrived in India in February 1945, with instructions to report directly to Sir Denys Pilditch, not ('repeat not') to Force 136. 61 Sir Denys wrote to Vickery at IPI on 22 February, noting that Bourne had arrived safely and observing that 'He appears to me just the sort of man we want to help us out in our present difficulty…I am extremely grateful to S.O.E. for having arranged to send him over'.
62

III
Bourne was introduced at a meeting at the office of the Commissioner of the Calcutta Police, Mr Rae, on 24 February. 63 The minutes of the meeting record that Rae was initially 'slightly suspicious' -perhaps unsurprisingly, given that this was the first occasion on which he had heard about the plan. However, when it was explained that 'there were no strings attached...and that, in fact, the organisation was initiated to aid the Police in Calcutta while fulfilling a certain number of Force 136 intelligence requirements', Rae became 'considerably more enthusiastic'. 64 Overtly part of the Calcutta Police, it was agreed that Bourne's Section would be housed in Security Control, Calcutta. Bourne's duties were outlined as: (e) The detention of possible Sino-Japanese agents in India.
65
Strict precautions were put in place to ensure that the connection between CIS and Force 136 remained secret. In all written correspondence, Bourne's section was to be referred to as 'Bristol'. Only nine Force 136 officers were to be told about its existence, while Major K.
Tosh, a Force 136 Security Officer, was designated as the only contact between Force 136 and CIS -and even here contact was to be made through a cut out. 66 Such strict secrecy was also to Little material detailing the subsequent activities of CIS has survived, save for a detailed report written by Bourne in August which provides some insight into how the work of the Section proceeded to develop, alongside his 'ideas as to the future' of the section. 70 Forwarding the report to Mackenzie, in a lengthy covering letter Guild outlined the difficulties Bourne had faced. While the proposed amalgamation with CIW had been avoided, the Commissioner of the Calcutta Police, Mr Rae, had proceeded to take 'little or no interest' in the Section, while Bourne also had to work with the 'notoriously difficult' Captain Tolson, DIB's representative in Calcutta. 'Fortunately', Guild reported, through the exercise of 'a great deal of tact', Bourne had 'been able to establish cordial relations' with him. 71 Guild also pointed to the replacement of Sir Denys with the 'fearsome' Norman Smith, who 'certainly' took less interest in the work of the Section than his predecessor. 72 By August, Bourne was running five agents, under the code-names 'Mayfield', 'Robin', 'Heathfield', 'Rotherfield' and 'Tony' (who had two sub-agents, both of whom were known as 'Chalmers'), and hoped that a further agent, 'Benenden', would soon arrive from Chungking. to be 'unreliable, corrupt, inefficient, inaccurate and so on'. 77 Indeed, Robert Bickers has drawn attention to the fact that the very terms of service of the Shanghai Municipal Police themselves stated that 'the criminal classes were chiefly Chinese', and that the Chinese, be they members of the police or the general population, 'needed watching', 78 a view Bourne now applied to the situation in India, arguing that its Chinese population 'needed watching continuously'. 79 His justification for such surveillance drew heavily upon a stereotype of the Chinese character; while having 'many good qualities' and being and an 'agreeable cheerful people', Bourne nevertheless characterised the Chinese as 'sly and clever...to turn a Chinese back if he sights safe profits, whether honest or dishonest, is a major operation'. 80 These qualities formed the basis of Bourne's concerns for the future.
IV
Amid the 'hastily arranged bonfires' that accompanied the transition to independence, as 'Nationalist parties that had previously been the principal targets of colonial security organizations were suddenly transformed into their prospective political masters', the issue of covert Chinese activity in India provided a point of continuity, an issue that in many respects transcended the question of who was in charge. 81 Bourne believed that Chinese activities in India 'should be kept under supervision so long as British interests are in any way concerned', which meant looking beyond the cessation of hostilities. He argued that 'organised counter intelligence' should continue post-war as he was in 'no doubt' that the Chinese Nationalists were 'taking a great interest in their "Overseas Chinese"', and that 'So long as British interests are concerned it will be of first importance to be a jump ahead of K.M.T. plans to exploit
British Political difficulties to their own advantage'. Bourne saw a threat that would only be heightened by the end of British rule, arguing that 'there is little doubt both the K.M.T. and individual Chinese have an eye on India, Burma, Ceylon and the Strait Settlements in the hope that with lessening British control they may step in'.
82
A similar point was made in London by a staff officer on SOE's Far East desk, codename AD6, in September 1945, by which point the question of the post-war future of CIS was being given urgent attention. Following the Japanese surrender, it constituted an unnecessary expense that SOE's Director of Finance, John Venner, was keen to put an end to as quickly as possible. 83 In a lengthy paper, the officer outlined a number of points which he considered 'sufficiently convincing to justify the retention of Bristol (or a similar organisation), whether it be retained solely for U.K. and/or Commonwealth interests or for the more narrow interests of India alone'. 84 While the prospect of an independent India had obvious implications for the existing British intelligence machinery, the officer argued that such covert Chinese activity would continue, irrespective of who held power:
The necessity to watch Chinese activities in all countries in the Far East is not only in the interests of the British Commonwealth, but is a direct interest to India. It is a necessity that surely will assume greater importance if India should become an independent, self-governing unit in the Commonwealth.
Therefore apart from the more general aspect of the importance of watching Chinese activities, it would be a great mistake for India to omit their share of the observation. Chinese have associated themselves with India in condemning "imperialism" and they would have no scruples should they wish to make difficulties for the Commonwealth by endeavouring to use India to embarrass and inconvenience the British or the Empire as a whole if they thought it suited their purposes'. 86 Boyle agreed that it was 'in the interests of...all clandestine departments and of the Government of India and of H.M.G. to keep alive and to improve an organisation of the Bristol type'. 87 However, it proved impossible to persuade any of the relevant organisations to take it on; neither the Security Service nor SIS were interested, while the new Director of the Intelligence Bureau, Norman Smith, proceeded to haggle over financial responsibility.
On 28 December, with SOE itself a matter of days away from dissolution, Gubbins cabled Brigadier John Anstey, the deputy head of Force 136 who was wrapping up its affairs in India, with the instruction that the liquidation of CIS was to be completed by 31 December.
Any agents required by the Intelligence Bureau were to be taken on by them by that date, while
Bourne was instructed to return to the UK, where SOE would 'try and find him another job to suit his circumstances'. 88 Anstey responded with a telegram to Boyle the following day, outlining a shift in Smith's position concerning the Bureau taking financial responsibility for the Section. 89 However, such horse-trading was now academic; a scribbled note across the top of an otherwise heavily redacted letter, dated 2 January 1946, recorded that '[Venner] has rung up to say that SOE in liquidation cannot and will not pay for this -it is up to DOB[sic]/SIS'. 90 It is unclear whether the Intelligence Bureau proceeded to take on any of Bourne's agents, while Bourne himself returned to the UK on 22 January. Liddell, who recorded the meeting in his diary. Much of their discussion focussed on the work of the Bureau, and concerns over Chinese activity. Bourne explained that the organisation was 'so much concerned with the Congress Party and internal politics that they gave little thought to the activities of the Chinese', such as gambling houses, on which the Bureau 'took the view that all Chinese gambled and that there was nothing to be done'. Warming to his wellrehearsed theme, Bourne pointed out that 'this was exactly how bandit armies started':
They began by having guards to look after gambling houses and then some potential warlord got control of all these guards and started to run various rackets. Ultimately he became extremely rich and a great power in the land.
Bourne had seen this happen in Shanghai over and over again. In his view the only thing to do was to nip it in the bud. 92 Surveillance of India's Chinese population could also, Bourne believed, help secure the postindependence future of the Bureau. However, he had found little support for his arguments:
The fact is that Civil Servants in India are so disheartened by the general trend of things that they are not bothering very much, although if DIB are to survive they could sell themselves much better to any Indian Govt. if they had a knowledge of attempts at penetration by the Chinese than if their knowledge was merely confined to Indian organisations. 93 Liddell was clearly impressed by Bourne, recording that he 'might be extremely valuable to us as a Chinese adviser at SIFE', the recently established multi-agency organisation which served as a central point for both collating and distributing intelligence related to British interests in the Far East. 94 At an MI5 staff meeting held on 7 February it was agreed that Bourne 'should be taken on as head of SIFE or DSO Singapore for two years'. From available archival material, the nature of his eventual appointment remains unclear. Bourne's terms of reference were 'being worked out by I.P.I.', 100 and Bourne departed for Delhi on 29 July. 101 It soon became apparent that the job would not be without its teething problems. In October, Liddell recorded a discussion based on a note received from Bourne 'in which he points out the difficulties of getting any information on internal affairs in India without arousing suspicion. Officials in D.I.B. were obviously self-conscious about the whole thing. He thought it unwise to press them, particularly since the attitude of 'I told you so' has caused a certain amount of resentment against British officials'. 102 Bourne did not remain as liaison officer for very long; on 5 December, Liddell recorded that Bill U'ren was to succeed him as SLO. 103 By the time of Bourne's departure as the first SLO in newly independent India, he would in all likelihood have been satisfied that the recently formed Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE) had turned its attention towards 'Chinese activities' as one of its three main subjects of study, alongside 'Communism' and 'Russian Activities'. 104 However, as Bourne's reports from New Delhi have not survived, while surviving SIFE material is only now starting to appear in the public domain, it is currently impossible to expand further. 105 While further research in the archives of the Intelligence Bureau itself would be necessary in order to chart post-Independence developments, it appears that the rise of Mao and China's turn to Communism went some way towards taking the edge off the security threat posed by India's Chinese population. While it was considered 'likely' that India's Nationalist Chinese would 'transfer their allegiance to any Government in China (whether Communist or a Communistdominated Coalition) which may emerge', the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) concluded that, provided that the Communist Party of India continued to be classed as an illegal organisation, developments in China were unlikely to have a significant impact in India. 106 This sentiment was shared by Krishna Menon, who in a detailed letter to Sir Archibald
Nye noted that, with China engaged in a period of 'political consolidation and economic rehabilitation', India 'need not therefore fear any serious danger from China directly in the near future'.
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A study of SOE's efforts to address suspicions concerning its Chinese recruits ultimately casts an interesting sidelight on security intelligence in India in the twilight years of the British empire. The need for CIS, in the absence of a Chinese Section of the Intelligence Bureau, illustrates how poorly prepared the Indian security authorities were to deal with threats that did not conveniently fit within the parameters drawn by colonial rule; the Chinese were not, yet, of concern on account of Communism, while Chiang Kai Shek's support for Congress and an independent India appears to have seen him regarded as an irritant to be scolded about his behaviour, rather than a serious threat to the established order. It can be suggested that this lack of an immediate, explicit imperial dimension to the threat likely goes some way towards explaining the short life of CIS, and the reluctance of any of the permanent organs of the security-intelligence apparatus to adopt it upon the dissolution of SOE in early 1946. The subject also brings up a further, tangential point of interest, in terms of the organisational make-up of CIS and its remit, as the body essentially combined security intelligence with criminal investigation. Walton and Andrew note that 'colonial policing, which involved law and order, was not the same as imperial security intelligence, which involved national security, and operated in a realm outside the confines of law enforcement'. 108 While that may more usually be the case, the Chinese Intelligence Section illustrates a body whose activities very clearly blurred the boundaries between these two worlds.
